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THE DEATH OF THE EFFICIENCY-EQUITY
TRADEOFF?: A COMMENTARY ON
MCMAHON'S THE MATTHEW EFFECT AND
FEDERAL TAXATION
RICHARD SCHMALBECK *
Abstract: Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr.'s Article on the Matthew effect
presents an important and timely argument about decreasing the income
inequality in the United States through the federal tax system. His
contention that the rich tend to get richer is widely supported by both
economic and social theories. But Professor McMahon may be too sanguine
about Congress's ability to increase top marginal tax rates significantly
without adversely affecting economic output. In particular, concerns about
the validity of the long-term studies on which he relies, and the failure to
account fully for the special circumstances of very high-income taxpayers,
suggest that only modest rate adjustments would be desirable.
INTRODUCTION
Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr.'s outstanding Article, The Mat-
thew Effect and Federal Taxation., is an important and timely work.' It
brings together a great deal of disparate research, and integrates it
into an argument of immense policy significance. 2 One can only hope
that it proves influential in the debates regarding the restructuring of
our tax rules that are likely to play out, over the remainder of the dec-
ade. As will be clear, I have some reservations about endorsing the full
measure of Professor McMahon's prescriptions. Nevertheless, his re-
search provides a solid base for inclining toward somewhat greater
progressivity in our income tax structure, reversing the tax policy ten-
dencies of recent years.
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
I See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 993 (2004).
2 See generally id.
1143
1144	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:1143
I. INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY AND WEALTH CONCENTRATION
The core phenomenon identified—that the rich tend to get
richer—is indeed widely prevalent and has been accelerating in the
United States in recent years. 3 Professor McMahon devotes about the
first two-fifths of his Article to the most thorough documentation of
this pattern that I have seen, drawing on evidence from Census Bu-
reau reports, Federal Reserve studies, Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") statistics, and a good deal of private research. 4 He makes an
overwhelming case.
Increasing wealth concentration seems, in many ways, to be a
natural phenomenon. Theorists from a relatively new field, called
"econophysics," have experimented recently with computer models
that assume an initially equal distribution of resources, and have ob-
served what happens when random outcomes are developed from
successive iterations of zero-sum trading games. 3 Although one might
expect that the repeated random sorting of outcomes would produce
a pattern of wealth-holding resembling a normal distribution, in fact,
the asymptotic tendency is for a single member of the trading com-
munity eventually to hold all the resources. 6
That exact result may not be very robust; tinkering with the as-
sumed conditions would likely produce somewhat different outcomes.
But upon reflection the outcome is not necessarily counterintuitive.
Somewhat fancifully, one can even imagine replicating it in a labora-
tory. For instance, we give Rat A an amount of cheese equal to twice
his normal caloric needs, while Rat B receives only a subsistence diet
during the same initial time period. Rat A consumes some of his ex-
cess allocation, but also saves some. If we assume interest-bearing
cheese, the dynamics of a growing disparity in wealth take off expo-
nentially. And if Rat A mates exclusively at the local rat country club,
and sends his little rat progeny to the best rat schools, where they
learn the best techniques for maze-running, thereby winning still
more cheese, we would surely obtain by no later than the third gen-
eration a group of young rats who, to paraphrase the words of Jim
3 Id. at 993-94.
4 Id. at 998-1044.
I
 An accessible summary of this research is contained in Brian Hayes, Follow the Money,
90 Am. SCIENTIST 400 (2002). The bulk of the material so summarized is published in
journals, such as the European Physical Journal, which presumably are read infrequently by
tax professionals See id. at 405.
s td. at 401.
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Hightower, are born on third base and think they've hit a triple.? The
need for a rat estate tax would at that point be clear to all, except
perhaps for those in Rat A's line of descent.
I may be guilty of anthropomorphizing; at least I would be if this
were really about rats. The point is that a tendency toward increasing
wealth concentration does, indeed, seem very natural in human soci-
ety. The concentration process does not even appear to depend on
differences in talent or other endowments, although those no doubt
exist and exacerbate the concentration tendencies. But even if we as-
sume that only random elements determine outcomes in the initial
stages of a society's economic activity, those elements will generate
disparate savings opportunities that will, in future iterations, generate
investment income that will exacerbate income inequality in subse-
quent periods. And because only people who are reasonably well off
can afford to save very much of their incomes, even a modest amount.
of income inequality will tend over time to create a greater degree of
wealth inequality. This tendency does not seem to have any natural
internal economic limits.
There are likely to be political limits to this tendency, however. In a
society resembling a state of nature, a person of increasing wealth
would have to devote ever greater shares of that wealth to protect it
from those who would appropriate it. In a more developed society, es-
pecially one governed by a democratic political system, the common-
wealth will presumably have something to say about the degree to
which wealth disparities are tolerable. Even in non-democratic societies,
wars and revolutions have a way of correcting intolerable wealth dis-
parities sooner or later.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE BUSH (II) TAX POLICIES
Strangely, the political limits are not much in evidence today. Af-
ter documenting the significant and growing disparities in income
and wealth distribution, Professor McMahon examines the effects of
the tax policies of the last few years, as reflected in the major tax acts
of 2001 through 2003. 8 These acts are largely the work of the current
Bush administration and the Republican majorities in both houses of
Congress. Professor McMahon demonstrates the impressive extent to
7 Roxanne Roberts, Like Father; Like Sons: The Bushes Have Become the Nation's Most Promi-
nent Political Dynasty, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2000, at C4 (attributing phrase to Texas De.
mocrat, Jim Hightower, with regard to former President, George H.W. Bush).
8 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1044-73.
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which these acts have favored high-income and high-wealth taxpayers,
thus contributing to the increasing after-tax income and wealth dis-
parities already existing when the new administration took office in
2001.9 This is not shocking news to anyone who has been paying at-
tention, but it is useful to have it laid out as convincingly and com-
prehensively as it has been in his Article.
Because we live in a democratic society, one might be tempted to
conclude that the increasing income and wealth concentration of re-
cent years is, in fact, within the limits our society is willing to tolerate;
indeed, far from trying to reduce the disparities, recent tax policy
seems to be encouraging them consciously, with at least tacit support
from the electorate. Of course, the current administration did not win
even a plurality of the votes in the last presidential election. So perhaps
the effects of recent tax legislation reflect no more than a technical de-
fect in our democratic structures, which deviate from the outcomes
that a more direct democracy (one without an electoral college, for ex-
ample) would produce.
But the democratic defect may run deeper than that As James
Repetti has argued, democracy in an electronic age is influenced in-
creasingly by campaign contributions. 1 ° Because they have much more
disposable income and wealth than those in lesser circumstances, the
rich are in a better position to advance their causes through electoral
processes.
The current administration also has exploited the fact that most
voters have only a crude understanding of the tax system. This has
allowed the administration, with Congress's help, to enact legislation
that might not be favored by a majority of Americans if they actually
understood its contents. But what many voters know is the following:
(1) they got a $600 bonus, paid as a separate "refund" check, in 2001,
and (2) their tax rates were reduced in 2003." As for other tax policy
debates, many voters apparently dismiss or significantly discount
much of what they hear as mere partisan bickering. Thus, very modest
tax cuts for middle-income taxpayers have established some minimal
level of support for a package of tax changes, the overall effects of
which disproportionately favor wealthy taxpayers.
9 Id.
10
 James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825,843-49 (2001).
11 This change is noted prominently on the cover page of the Form 1040 instructions
for 2003, and described first among the 2003 changes summarized on page 14 of those
instructions. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003 1040 INSTRUCTIONS I, 14 (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040.pdL
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III. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: No TRADEOFF AFTER ALL?
If lie did no more than document as solidly as he has that income
inequality and wealth concentration are alarmingly large, and still
growing, Professor McMahon would have done a great service. But
the succeeding sections of his Article are much more ambitious. They
begin by summarizing and integrating work over the last decade or so
that seems to say that much of what we thought we knew about the
impact of taxes on behavior simply isn't true." The conventional wis-
dom Professor McMahon now questions goes back to at least A.C.
Pigott." It was crisply summarized by Henry Simons in his famous
1938 treatise on income tax as follows: II] t is reasonable to expect
that every gain, through taxation, in better distribution will be ac-
companied by some loss in production."" This sense is reflected in
the very title of Arthur M. Okun's influential book, Equality and
Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff  And it is deeply embedded in John Rawls's
sense that society should be organized to produce an income distribu-
tion that provides the highest possible income to the lowest-income
individual—his so-called "maximin" approach."
So the notion that we can accomplish some redistribution
through the combination of tax and revenue programs, but only at the
expense of total output, has a long and impressive pedigree, supported
by the theories and research of a widely diverse group of scholars. A
hypothetical illustration may be useful in demonstrating some of the
dynamics of what we may call the "conventional wisdom" model of the
impact of tax rates on total production. Suppose that a two-person so-
ciety consists of A, a relatively high-output worker, who could produce
150 units of output per year, and B, a lower-output worker who pro-
duces 100 units per year. Suppose further that the tax rules of the so-
ciety are that all output in excess of 100 units is taxed at some specified
marginal rate, and that the output so collected from the high-output
worker is distributed to the lower-output worker. Finally, suppose that
the following table expresses the relationship between the tax rate and
the output of the higher-output worker."
12 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1074-99.
13 A.G. I'mou, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 59-63 (1928).
14 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (1938).
15 See genetalbr AR'IllUR M. ORUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
16 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-57 (1971).
17 This particular model assumes that taxes have no impact on the less productive
worker because that is an unnecessary complication. One notes, however, that there might
be a negative impact on the lower-output worker's willingness to work as well.
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Marginal Tax Rates
0% 30% 40% 50%
A's Pre-Tax Output 150 140 130 120
A's Tax 0 12 12 10
A's Post-Tax Output 150 128 118 110
B's Pre-Tax Output 100 100 100 100
B's Negative Tax 0 12 12 10
B's Post-Tax Income 100 112 112 110
After-Tax Ratio, A:B 1.50:1 1.14:1 1.06:1 1.00:1
Total Output 250 240 230 220
This hypothetical society raises some interesting questions. For
example, would the move from a 30% rate to a 40% rate be justified?
Both meet the maximin condition. But the move is Pareto inefficient
because it makes A worse off without improving the absolute situation
of B. It does lessen inequality, however, as measured by the ratio of
after-tax incomes. If reducing inequality is this society's predominant
goal, then even the 50% rate could be justified.
Most theorists—including Rawls—Would not push redistribution
that far. But in the late 1970s, an arguMent began to emerge that the
U.S. individual tax rates were actually beyond the point at which a
maximin state would be achieved. More specifically, it was asserted
that tax rates were then so high that, paradoxically, revenues could be
increased by reducing tax rates." This was the argument made by
proponents of the Laffer Curve, (Figure 1), so named in honor of
Arthur Laffer, the economist who supposedly laid it out on a cocktail
napkin for an aide to President Gerald Ford."
18 See Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the "Laffer Curve," 50 PUB. INT. 3.4 (1978).
19 See id. at 3. On his website, Jude Wanniski explains that he first watched Arthur Laf-
fer scribble the Laffer Curve on a cocktail napkin in 1974 for Vice President Dick Cheney,
then an aide to President Gerald Ford. Jude Wanniski, Fall 2003 SSU Lesson #5 The Laffer
Curve, at http://wanniski.com/showarticle.asp?articleid=2965  (Oct. 3, 2003).





Figure 1: The Laffer Curve
As can be seen, the curve shows revenue rising more or less pro-
portionally with the tax rate at relatively low rates, with revenue con-
tinuing to rise, but less steeply, as rates ascend into a middle area. Fi-
nally, as rates increase beyond X%, they enter what Laffer called the
prohibitive zone. Beyond that point, revenues actually fall as rates
continue to rise, presumably because tax avoidance measures eat into
the tax base to a degree that higher rates cannot offset.
Of course, there were two quite separate assertions contained in
Laffer's argument. The first was that the generally parabolic shape of
the curve represents the relationship between tax rates and revenue
accurately. The second was that the U.S. tax system had reached that
tipping point and was operating in the prohibitive zone."
The first assertion has been less controversial than the second.
After all, even Adam Smith has noted, in the context of a system of
differential excise taxes, that high tax rates, "by diminishing the con-
2° Actually, there were several other questions that might have been raised, but
weren't, in part because it was politically useful to be vague about questions like, What rate
are we talking about? The single highest marginal rate in the income tax? Or the marginal
rate faced by the average taxpayer? And does the effect vary depending on the type of
income, or on other characteristics of the person who earns it? Et cetera. Some of these
will be considered below.
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sumption of the taxed commodities ... frequently afford a smaller
revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moder-
ate taxes."21 That is a clear assertion that the Laffer Curve has the
right shape. And until recently, an unbroken line of both economic
theory and empirical research seemed to support that sense.
But there were, and still are, important differences of opinion on
the second question—whether the U.S. income tax was ever in the
prohibitive zone? Professor McMahon comes down on the side of the
skeptics, saying flatly that the Laffer Curve has been "discredited." 22
Indeed, Professor McMahon undertakes in his Article a broad attack
on the very idea that tax rates discourage the production of income
from either capital or labor, thus calling into question even the as-
sumed parabolic shape of the relationship between tax rates and total
revenues.23
His attack is based in large part on recent studies by economists
casting doubt on the impact of tax rate changes. 24 The Laffer Curve
depends on sharp behavioral responses—which erode or augment the
tax base—to rate changes. But the recent research suggests modest, or
even non-existent; That is an exhilarating possibility for
one who would like to use higher tax rates to achieve income and
wealth redistribution. It amounts to no less than the repeal of the
trade-off betweenequity and efficiency.
Although I:share Professor McMahon's predispositions on this
topic, I am lessi ,tsanguine than he is about the data. My doubts stern
from the following separate sources: (1) technical concerns about
long-run research; and (2) a sense that analysis of the behavior of very
high-income, htic1f,wealth individuals presents special problems that
Professor McMahOn'may not have fully taken into account.
21 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF '111E WEALTH or NA-
TIONS 552 ( J.C. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776).
" McMahon, supra note 1, at 1076.
25 Id. at 1077-95.
24 Id.; see Joel Slemrod, The Dynamic Tax Economist, 56 THE TAX LAWYER 611, 613
(2003); see also EMMANUEL SAEZ, REPORTED INCOMES AND MARGINAL TAX RATES, 1960-
2000: EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10273, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10273.pdf . Sec gener-
ally Frank Sammartino & David Weiner, Recent Evidence on Taxpayer's Response to the Rate
Increases in the 1990s, 50 NAT'L TAx J. 683 (1997).
25 See Slemrod, supra note 24, at 613; sec also SAEZ, supra note 24, at 4. See generally
Sammartino & Weiner, supra note 24, at 683.
2004}	 The Death of the Efficiency-Equity Tradeoff 	 1151
IV. LONG-TERM VERSUS SHORT-TERM VIEWS
My methodological concern is simply that Professor McMahon
may be relying too much on studies that purport to look at long-run
tax elasticities.26 A bit of a division in the economic science has arisen
as to tax elasticities in the last decade or so and can be summarized as
follows. An analyst can focus very tightly on the time period surround-
ing a tax change, in order to hold as much else constant as possible.
For example, one could study the effect of a tax cut on charitable giv-
ing by comparing the level of such gifts in the year immediately be-
fore the tax change with the level in the year immediately following.
Such studies have shown relatively high tax elasticities, suggesting a
strong response to rate changes.2 7
But those studies have been criticized as revealing only short-term
effects. Taxpayers may simply be timing charitable gifts that they would
make in any case to coincide with the periods in which the tax effects
are most generous. Thus, in the face of fluctuating rates, taxpayers wait
until rates are high to make their gifts, and reduce charitable giving
when rates are low. Such game-playing is largely a short-term phe-
nomenon, because if rates remain unchanged for some time follow-
ing the rate change under study, giving tends to revert to previous
levels, or nearly so.28
Although there is no doubt much truth in this argument, there
are other problems with trying to prove "permanent" effects by analy-
sis of long-term data. One problem is that the background economic
facts change over time, and the more time a study encompasses, the
more change one can expect to find. Analysts try to account for those
changes that can be identified and measured, but. there is always some
uncertainty about whether important variables have been omitted or
have not been accounted for adequately.
As one considers social and economic changes over the last several
decades, several changes that might influence long-term economic data
come to mind. Married women's increased participation in the labor
force, and women's concomitant increase in investments in their hu-
26 See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1077-95.
27 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein & Charles Clotfelter, Tax Incentives for Charitable Contribu-
tions in the United States, 51 Pun. ECON. 1,24 (1976) (presenting the first study to model
and measure these effects rigorously).
28 See, e.g., William. C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of
Charitable Contributions, 1031 Pot,. ECON. 709,709-10 (1995).
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man capital, is one that may have salience. 29 The net annual gains in
prices of stocks have fluctuated dramatically over the last several dec-
ades; this could also be a confounding factor." Increased globalization
and the increased efficiency of communications and information proc-
essing could also present confounding factors to long-term studies. 31
V. THE VERY SPECIAL CASE OF VERY HIGH-WEALTH INDIVIDUALS
My second concern relates to the degree to which overall data
may obscure aspects of the behavior of very high-income, high-wealth
individuals. An example is the assertion by Professor McMahon that
the Laffer Curve has been discredited.32 Certainly the revenue data in
the years following the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198P 3—the act
most closely associated with the Laffer Curve justification—appear to
show a significant decline." This indicates that the pre-1981 rate
structure overall almost certainly was not in the prohibitive zone of
the Laffer Curve.
But analysis of high-income taxpayers has been much more
equivocal. Supply-side economists, such as Lawrence Lindsay, found
that the rate cuts phased in during the early 1980s did produce a
2° For example, Professor McMahon argues that as tax rates have fallen, so has the av-
erage work week, suggesting a direct rather than the predicted inverse relationship of tax
rates and hours worked. See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1082. Although hours per em-
ployee could be declining, hours per household could be increasing if female labor force
participation is increasing.
30 For example, because personal savings as conventionally measured does not include
unrealized gains or losses in assets, studies of savings as a function of tax rates may miss the
fact that in years of rapid growth in stock values, taxpayers may have believed (perhaps
correctly) that the increasing values of their portfolios obviated the need for additional
savings.
31 For example, the greatly increased sophistication in capital markets, powered in
part by technological change, has led to much-increased use of exotic financial instru-
ments like hedge funds, collars, and the now-proscribed "short sales against the box."
These devices made it even easier for high wealth individuals to avoid being taxed on their
capital gains. Because these devices were growing in use just as capital gains rates were
falling, they could have complicated the view of capital gains tax rates as a determinant of
capital gains realization rates.
52 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1076.
33 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
34 Less than two years after the passage of the 1981 Act, the President's Council of
Economic Advisors indicated frankly that "[title Federal budget deficit has become a ma-
jor problem for the American economy." ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 26 (1983).
Tables included as an appendix to that report indicated that the fiscal year 1983 budget
deficit was expected to be $201.1 billion, nearly four times the size of the fiscal year 1981
deficit of $59.1 billion. Id. at 251.
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markedly positive revenue response among high-bracket taxpayers,
confirming the prohibitive zone presumption for that subgroup of
taxpayers. 35 Economists at the Congressional Budget Office (the
"CBO")—hardly a hotbed of supply-siders—appear to have agreed
with these findings." Even Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija, who wrote
the source Professor McMahon cites for the proposition that the Laf-
fer Curve has been discredited, concede that the increase in incomes
of high-income taxpayers in the years following the Tax Reform Act. of
198657—the second of the dramatic rate cuts undertaken during the
Reagan administration—was due in substantial part to the effects of
the tax cuts. 38 To be fair, Slemrod and Bakija offer explanations other
than the Laffer Curve for much or all of the effect. 39 Nevertheless, in
their section on the effect of rate changes on high-bracket taxpayers,
they note that It] he evidence from years surrounding announced or
anticipated tax changes clearly reveals a mixture of timing responses
and the more permanent responses to tax changes, and it is difficult to sort
out one from the other."4° As to high-bracket taxpayers, then, this is
hardly the repudiation of the Pigou/Okun/Rawls/Laffer relationship
that Professor McMahon seems to suggest. 4 '
And it is high-bracket taxpayers that we are mostly concerned
with in considering the issue of whether the tax system can be used to
lessen the existing income and wealth disparities. In Part VIII of his
Article, Professor McMahon urges a return to a more steeply gradu-
ated rate structure and repeal of preferences for capital gains. 42 But if
those changes produce little additional revenue, not much redistribu-
tion can be accomplished. We could still reduce inequality to some
degree, but we would be doing so by lowering high incomes without
raising low ones. The ethical desirability of such a move is dubious.
33 LAWRENCE 11. LINDSEY, THE GROWTH EXPERIMENT: HOW 'I'lIE NEW TAX POLICY IS
TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ECONOMY 81-92 (1990).
"Rosemarie M. Neilson et al., CBO Replies to Lindsey, 35 TAX NOTES 496, 501 (1987).
37 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
39 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DE-
BATE OVER TAXES 147 (3d ed. 2004) (swing that "the sharpness of the increase [in in-
comes of high-bracket taxpayers] right around 1986 suggests that the tax cut [in that year]
was a major factor in the increase"); McMahon, supra note 1, at 1076 n.339.
39 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 38, at 147.
4° Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
41 See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1076.
42 Id. at 1122-28.
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VI. RISING ABOVE THE DATA
In the absence of proof that raising taxes on the wealthy would
actually produce significant additional revenue, one is forced to rely
on intuition. One way to inform one's intuition about this issue is to
consider some aspects of the Laffer Curve analysis described above.
The Laffer Curve represents the effects of tax elasticity—the marginal
tax rate diminishes the net price at which taxpayers can sell their la-
bor, or rent their capital, and thus discourages those activities. But it is
clear that the shape of the Laffer Curve varies among taxpayers, as
well as for different types of income. It makes sense, then, to think of
the set of Laffer Curves that may represent taxpayer responses in sev-
eral of the most likely paradigms.
By far the most common paradigm for the general population is
income from full-time employment. As to such income, one would
expect relatively low tax elasticity. After all, most full-time employment
situations simply do not offer much flexibility in terms of the amount
of labor the taxpayer can sell. Few full-time employees would have the
option of working 35-hour weeks when taxes are high, or 45-hour
weeks when taxes are low.
Income from employment, however, is much less significant, as a
proportion of income, for very high-income taxpayers than for those
in less lofty income ranges. According to IRS statistics, 75.2% of all
income of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes below $1 million was
from wage and salary income. 4s But only 31.1% of the income of tax-
payers above the $1 million level was from wage and salary sources."
In the top category, among those with incomes above $10 million,
only 25.2% of income was from those sources. 45
What is the primary source of income among the wealthy? In
large part, their income is derived from capital gains. While taxpayers
with adjusted gross incomes below $1 million received only 2.9% of
their 2001 income in the form of capital gains, taxpayers above that
level received fully 31.8% of their income in that form. 46 In fact,
among taxpayers in the highest category—with adjusted gross in-
1! These calculations are based on INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001: INDI-
VIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS tb1.1.4, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/
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conies in excess of $10 million—more than half of their aggregate
income (50.5%) was in the form of capital gains. 47
This is terribly significant, because the most important circum-
stance to be considered in constructing a Laffer Curve specific to a
particular type of income is the ease with which the tax on that type of
income can be avoided. And in a tax system with a realization re-
quirement, the tax on capital gains is by far the easiest to avoid—one
simply avoids having the realization event that would trigger the tax. 48
One crucially important aspect of this is that, in most cases, avoiding a
tax requires avoidance of the income itself. One refuses, for example,
an opportunity to work overtime hours, thus avoiding the tax on the
income one might have had, but at the cost of losing the after-tax in-
come as well. In the case of capital gains tax avoidance, however, the
income is still there; it just hasn't been converted to cash.
The wealthy are skilled at avoiding realization events and would
become more so in the face of higher rates. If they need liquidity, the
wealthy can usually borrow against the assets in their portfolios without
generating a realization event. If they wish to diversify their portfolios
to guard against the risks of having too much of the portfolio invested
in a single type of asset (such as founder's stock in a corporation),
there are a variety of ways to proceed." The devices available are not
perfect substitutes for a sale of the asset and can be somewhat costly.
Thus, we continue to see taxpayers realizing some taxable capital gains.
But if we were to both increase overall marginal rates to something in
excess of 40%, and repeal the special rates for capital gains, we would
nearly triple the rate—now generally only 15%—applicable to most
capital gains. It is simply unreasonable to think that the effect of such
changes on realization rates would be anything short of dramatic. 5°
47 Id,
48 Because section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code generally gives heirs a basis
equal to the value of the asset at the testator's death, accrued gains need never be taxed to
anyone if the asset is held until death. Sec I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2000).
49 A full description of the methods is beyond the scope of this Commentary. For this
purpose, a simple device is to contribute the stock in question to a partnership formed
with others who are in the same position, but have different assets to contribute. The con-
tribution to the partnership ordinarily will not be a realization event, and the interest in
the partnership will be more diversified than the assets that each partner contributes to it.
5° Note that since 1981, the maximum rate on long-term capital gains has never been
higher than 28%, and, until last year, never lower than 20%. Thus, any econometric studies
of data within the last twenty-three years could have examined only a narrow range of rate
changes. Even assuming that the studies that show relatively low responses to capital gains
changes are accurate, it would still involve a good deal of unscientific extrapolation to infer
that rates in the 30% range and above would not produce more dramatic taxpayer responses.
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Capital gains are the extreme example, but it is generally true that
tax burdens on income from capital are easier to avoid than those im-
posed on income from labor. And that is critically important if the goal
is to extract more revenue from the very rich, whose income is largely
derived from capital rather than labor. Among other things, it is often
possible to convert potential ordinary income from capital into capital
gains, such as by adjustment of dividend policies of corporations that
the taxpayer controls or can influence. It is also easier to evade taxes
with respect to capital income than with respect to labor income. The
latter is typically received from a U.S. payor who reports the payment to
the IRS. But it is relatively easy to get capital out of the United States, in
which case evading tax on the income from that capital is as simple as
opening a numbered account in one of the several off-shore jurisdic-
tions catering to the market for this form of evasion."
CONCLUSION
In summary, I remain skeptical that trying to increase tax rates
on high-income taxpayers to anything resembling the pre-1986 levels
would be very effective in significantly reducing the income inequality
and wealth concentration problems we face. Nevertheless, Professor
McMahon's analysis does show that we need not be terribly nervous
about modest adjustments in rate structures. His analysis of the data
does suggest that a return to the rate structure that applied before
2001 might well improve equity at little or no cost in terms of eco-
nomic output or growth." Beyond that, who knows?
61 See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1078-80, Professor McMahon argues that if enforce-
ment is the problem, then better enforcement is the solution. Id. at 1079. But I don't think
it is that simple. Enforcement has sizable costs in terms of direct government resources.
private compliance costs, and psychic losses due to intrusions and loss of privacy that may
be imposed on both compliant and noncompliant taxpayers. (For example, customs
agents could thoroughly search every American citizen or resident who leaves the country
to assure that individuals are not carrying more than the permitted amounts of cash, or
high-value commodities such as diamonds. But for every misbehaving taxpayer we found,
we would have needlessly inconvenienced hundreds of individuals who had no intention
of funding off-shore accounts.) One notes as well that enforcement costs are themselves
partly a function of tax rates—as rates increase, so do the gains from cheating, and so too
will the enforcement costs necessary to maintain acceptable compliance levels.
62 See id. at 1074-99.
